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1. Introduction
What determines trade policy? While this may seem to be mainly a question for political
scientists, it has become of increasing concern to international trade theorists, faced with the obvious
disjunction between the free trade prescriptions of standard trade models, and the protectionist
policies pursued by so many governments (Rodrik 1995). The intellectual stakes for economists have
increased further with the advent of endogenous growth models, which predict that policies can have
important long run growth effects, as opposed to the fairly trivial deadweight losses implied by static
constant returns models. Clearly, it is not sufficient to take these policies as exogenous, and examine
their implications: to understand growth, the theory seems to be telling us, we need to understand
why some countries pursue appropriate policies, and others inappropriate ones.
When faced with such questions, the instinct of economists is to eschew state-centred or
cognitive theories, and to reach for the rational choice approach: politicians supply policies; voters
and/or interest groups demand them; the institutional environment helps determine the ways in which
these demands and supplies interact with each other, and thus the eventual equilibrium. In these
models, a key consideration is the determination of individual voter preferences, which in turn
depends on the structure of the economy in question. In an environment in which factors are ￿stuck￿
in particular sectors, as in the specific factors model, factors have a direct stake in those particular
sectors; thus, management and labor in each sector will agree with each other that their sector
deserves protection (if it is an import-competing sector), or that free trade is the best policy (if it is an
exporting sector). On the other hand, if factors are mobile between sectors, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, then unskilled workers everywhere will have the same interest (since they all earn the same
wage), as will skilled workers, and capital, and all other relevant, mobile, factors of production. In
this case, ￿abundant￿ factors will favor free trade, and ￿scarce￿ factors will favor protection
(Rogowski 1989). Classic economic contributions to the literature, such as Findlay and Wellisz
(1982), Mayer (1984), Magee, Brock and Young (1989), and Grossman and Helpman (1994), all
assume such a rational choice world, with some adopting a specific factors specification, and others a1 A controversial claim, to be sure: see Irwin (1989) for one view, and Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) for
another.
2 One should be wary of oversimplifying the implications of nationalist ideology for foreign
economic policy. Shulman, for example, shows that Quebec, Hindu and Ukrainian nationalists
experience both integrationist and protectionist incentives and that policy choices depend on a
number of situational factors (Shulman, 2000). One could cite the Republic of Ireland’s decision to
abandon protectionism in the late 1950s and its subsequent pursuit of European integration as another
case in point. However, the main thrust of nationalist ideology, particularly at the mass level,
probably remains autarkic; at any event this is the hypothesis tested in the paper.
3 See for example several contributions to Bhagwati (ed., 1982).
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Heckscher-Ohlin one.
On the other hand, there are powerful empirical reasons for believing that interests alone may
not provide a complete explanation for the evolution of trade policy: ideas (or ideology) may matter
too. Sometimes the ideology is socialist, as in the case of COMECON, while the case of late 19
th
century Britain arguably provides an example of the power of liberal ideology.
1 In this paper we take
seriously a third possibility: that a preference for economic protectionism among voters is a function
of strong feelings of national identity and an associated set of patriotic and nationalist attitudes that
include pride in country, sense of national superiority and, at the extreme, antagonistic attitudes
towards those who are not part of the nation. Of course, nationalist ideology may have its origins in a
conjuncture between identity and group interests, and particularly in a conjuncture between identity
and perceptions of inequality (Gellner 1983); the point here, however, is that, whatever their origins,
nationalist attitudes are likely to have a certain autonomy and may exercise an independent influence
on the way in which individuals react to the opening up of trade and to other globalization issues.
2 
These competing explanations have radically different policy implications. If support for
economic protectionism is a function of the material interests of individuals, it can in principle be
dealt with by offering side payments that compensate for the losses that result from liberalization. For
example, in a specific factors framework workers who have been displaced from declining industries
can be given help in relocating to other sectors;
3 in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, the problems faced
by unskilled workers in rich countries can be reduced by education and training schemes that, in4 See for example Irwin (1994), or Kaempfer and Marks (1993).
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principle, lower unskilled labor supply. If, on the other hand, protectionist policy preferences are
rooted in nationalist attitudes, the strategy to alter them will have to be very different, and the
strategist may have to be less sanguine about the prospects of success. Of course, the truth may well
lie somewhere between these alternatives, with both interests and ideology reinforcing opposition to
free trade. In this case it becomes necessary to tease out the relative effects of each, and to identify
the conditions under which such effects operate.
In pursuing these questions, this paper starts with rational choice models of policy formation,
and asks to what extent does the Heckscher-Ohlin model provide a useful guide to predicting trade
policy preferences. This question has often been addressed in the empirical economics literature:
typically, authors have used aggregate data to ask whether factor interests or sectoral interests are
more important in determining policy preferences. For example, Magee (1978) looked at industry
testimony before the US Congress in 1973, and found that labor and capital seemed to have the same
interests within each sector, suggesting that a specific factors model is appropriate. More typically,
voting behavior has been related to constituency characteristics, either in the context of US
Congressional votes on trade-related issues, or in the context of national elections that are assumed to
have been fought largely on such issues.
4
This paper pursues a different strategy. The inquiry is pitched, not at the level of interest
groups (where, almost by definition, interests are likely to be determining), or at the level of the
electoral constituency (where data on ideological and political variables are likely to be missing), but
at the level of individuals or mass public opinion. In so doing, we are following in the footsteps of
Balistreri (1997), and Scheve and Slaughter (2001), both of whom use survey data to tackle the
question of who is in favor of free trade, and why. As Scheve and Slaughter (citing Rodrik, 1995)
point out, individual-level preferences regarding trade must lie at the heart of any rational choice
account of policy-formation, but using aggregate data provides only indirect information on agents￿
preferences, since ￿policy preferences and institutions together determine policy actions, so the5 Since beginning this project, we have become aware of the simultaneous and independent work
being pursued by Anna Maria Mayda and Dani Rodrik (2001), who use the same ISSP survey data as
we do, and who reach many of the same conclusions.
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mapping from preferences to actions is not unambiguous￿ (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, p. 4).
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Of course, using survey data has its own limitations. If the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model
accurately describes the world, then that has profound (and negative) implications for the impact of
North-South trade on Northern wage inequality, and equally profound, but positive, implications for
the impact of that same trade on Southern wage inequality. It might well have political implications
for the ease with which the transition economies of Eastern Europe can be integrated into the
European Union. Finally, it would clearly have intellectual implications for the way in which
theorists should specify their models of endogenous tariff formation. Leaving aside measurement
problems in attitude research (to which we return below), survey data on their own cannot tell us
whether the Heckscher-Ohlin model in fact describes reality; all that they can tell us is that agents￿
preferences are consistent, or inconsistent, with the predictions of the model. Our claim is that
findings of the latter, more cautious, variety are useful, since the determinants of preferences matter
in themselves, both intellectually and politically. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of what theory has
to say about the impact of trade on skilled and unskilled wages, since it is this link that leads us to
expect a relationship between skill and trade policy preferences. Section 3 introduces the data,
including our measures of nationalist attitudes, and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of our
evidence relative to the data used by previous authors. Section 4 provides an ordered probit analysis
of the determinants of individual trade preferences in 24 countries, including both ￿economic￿ and
￿ideological￿ determinants. Finally, Section 5 concludes by drawing some preliminary inferences and
outlining an agenda for future research.5
2. Trade and wages: a theoretical digression
In a simple 2 country, 2 commodity, 2 factor (skilled and unskilled labor) framework the
links between trade and wage gaps are clear. Assume that Mexico is abundant in unskilled labor, and
that the US is abundant in skilled labor. Let NAFTA reduce the barriers to trade between the two
economies: Mexico will export and produce more unskilled-labor intensive products, and the demand
for unskilled labor will increase; while it will import more skill-intensive goods, which will lead to a
reduced demand for skilled workers, and a fall in the skilled wage. Wage inequality in Mexico will
thus fall; unskilled Mexican workers should favor free trade, while skilled workers should oppose it.
Of course precisely the opposite will occur in the US: skilled wages will rise and unskilled wages
will fall; thus in the US it is the unskilled who should be protectionist, and the skilled who should
favor free trade.
There have been several recent trade-theoretic papers exploring the ways in which the links
between trade and income distribution become more complicated once we move away from simple
2x2x2 models. These contributions have been largely motivated by the fact that, while simple
Heckscher-Ohlin logic might seem to suggest that globalization should lower skill differentials in the
South, in fact differentials have widened in several developing countries (DCs) during the past 20
years. One possibility is that FDI, associated with trade liberalization, might lead to new skill-
intensive activities being introduced into DCs (Feenstra and Hanson 1996). Under such
circumstances, the relative demand for skilled labor could rise in the South. Alternatively, if skilled
labor and capital are complementary to some natural resource (e.g. minerals), then liberalization in a
resource-rich DC might increase skill premia and inequality overall (Kanbur 1999). Clearly, allowing
for more than 2 factors of production, or for links between trade and factor flows, or between trade
and technology transfers, leads to theoretical ambiguity regarding the relationship between trade and
wages. Nonetheless, it is interesting to ask whether the predictions of simple 2x2 models help to shed
light on policy preferences generated in the admittedly complicated real world.
Even within a simple two-factor framework, however, there is another set of complications6
that have to be faced: not all DCs are homogenous. Instead, they differ greatly in their endowments of
capital, labor and skills. Davis (1996) points out that in a 2-factor (capital and labor) world, a country
may be globally labor-abundant, but locally capital-abundant, in the sense that it is capital-abundant
relative to other countries in the same ￿production cone￿; for such a country, liberalization lowers
wages. By implication, a middle-income country such as Mexico might be skill-abundant relative to
countries like China and India; they might therefore protect their unskilled-labor-abundant sectors;
and they might thus see skill premia rising on liberalization (Slaughter 2000; Wood 1997). There is in
fact evidence that unskilled-labor intensive sectors received the most protection in countries such as
Mexico and Morocco prior to liberalization (Currie and Harrison 1997; Hanson and Harrison 1999).
The argument may have some relevance for this study. With the exception of the Philippines,
our data set does not include any third world countries (see below); rather, it contains data for rich
countries, and for the transition economies of Eastern Europe. We will be interested to see whether
there are different determinants of trade policy preferences in the latter group of economies than in
the former; but the Davis article reminds us that while these countries may be poor relative to the
West, they are rich, and skill-abundant, relative to most of the rest of the world. In that sense, our
sample is a truncated one, and the results need to be interpreted in that light.
In particular, Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that the highly-skilled will favor free trade in
the most skill-abundant countries (such as the USA): in these countries, a regression explaining
protectionist attitudes should find a negative coefficient on skills. Whether the coefficient on skills in
the least skill-abundant country in our sample should be positive or negative depends entirely on
where that country fits in terms of the world-wide hierarchy of skill-abundance; the sign of the
coefficient is thus a priori unclear. In order to test Heckscher-Ohlin theory, therefore, we will pursue
two strategies. First, we will estimate models (for the entire sample of countries) of the form:
PROTECTij = αi + β1SKILLj + β2SKILLj*GDPCAPi + β3Xij + εij (1)6 Equations (1) and (2) are used for expositional purposes; however, because of the nature of the data,
we actually estimate non-linear ordered probit models, as explained below. As shown the
specification incorporates country dummies, but we also experiment by running regressions without
these country fixed effects.
7 We used country GDP per capita rather than educational attainment variables for reasons given in
Section 4; this amounts to assuming that GDP per capita is highly correlated with country
endowments of human capital.
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where PROTECTij is the extent to which individual j in country i is protectionist; SKILLj is a
measure of the individual￿s skill; GDPCAPi is the GDP per capita of country i; and Xij is a vector of
control variables.
6 In this set-up, the test of whether Heckscher-Ohlin theory holds is the sign of the
interaction term, β2, which should be negative, since in richer countries high-skilled workers should
be more in favor of free trade (i.e. less protectionist).
7 
Second, we run country-specific regressions of the form 
PROTECTj = α + β1SKILLj + β2Xj + εj (2)
and compare the β1 coefficients across countries. Again, the test of Heckscher-Ohlin theory is
whether these coefficients are systematically lower (i.e. more negative) in richer, more skill-abundant
countries.
3. The data
What do we need to accomplish our objectives? We need a data set that provides information
on individuals￿ trade preferences, socio-economic position, socio-demographic characteristics and
political attitudes. Since the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that skill levels will have different
implications for trade policy preferences in different countries, the data should be cross-national in
scope.
What we have are data provided by the 1995 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
module on national identity. The ISSP is an international consortium of survey research agencies that8 Full details on the ISSP consortium, including details on membership, rules and  procedures and
availability of datasets and technical reports can be obtained at http://www.issp.org/info.htm
9 One might argue that the inclusion of the phrase ￿in order to protect its national economy￿ is
unfortunate in that it could bias responses in a protectionist direction by assuming that limiting
imports is in some sense good for the economy. On the other hand, this is the way protectionist
measures are defended in political discourse. Furthermore, we are interested in the relationships
between this variable and our independent variables, not in estimating the absolute levels of support
for protectionism. This objective is much less vulnerable to any response bias that may exist. 
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conducts comparative public opinion research on economic, social and political issues across a wide
range of countries on a regular basis. The sample in each country is a national representative random
sample of the adult population designed to achieve a norm of 1,400 cases and, in any event, not less
than 1,000 cases. Questionnaires are designed to be completed in 15 minutes (not including a
standard set of socio-demographic questions); questionnaires are also designed to be suitable for self-
administration.
8 The ISSP national identity survey was conducted in twenty-four countries in 1995-
96. The countries concerned were: Australia, West Germany, East Germany, Great Britain, the USA,
Austria, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Slovenia,
Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, New Zealand, Canada, the Phillippines, Japan, Estonia, Latvia and
Slovakia. The questionnaire (as implemented in the Republic of Ireland) is available on request. 
Our dependent variable is the scaled response to a question that asked respondents how much
they agreed or disagreed with the statement that their country ￿should limit the import of foreign
products in order to protect its national economy￿ (question 6 in the survey). While in an ideal world
one would like to have a battery of questions on trade policy preferences, we take this to be a
reasonable operationalization of protectionist sentiment.
9 The data set also provides individual-level
measures of a range of demographic, socio-economic and political variables. Among the socio-
economic variables, the most valuable from the point of view of testing the implications of trade
theory is the respondent￿s skill level. This is arrived at by coding the answers to questions on
respondents￿ occupation using the International Labour Organisation￿s ISCO88 (International
Standard Classification of Occupations) coding scheme. ISCO88 is a radical revision of the ILO￿s
previous occupational coding scheme (ISCO68). The main thrust of the revision makes ISCO889
particularly relevant for our purposes. As Ganzeboom and Treiman put it, ￿￿ the logic of the
classification is mostly derived from skill requirements at the expense of industry distinctions￿ and
the overall effort may ￿be seen as an attempt to introduce more clear-cut skill distinctions into
ISCO88￿ (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996, p. 206). They go on to illustrate this point by noting that
￿whereas in ISCO68 all ￿Textile Workers￿ were organized in a single minor group, irrespective of
their skill level (thereby precluding distinctions based on skill), textile workers are now spread out
over three different minor groups, depending on whether they do elementary labor, operate machines,
or perform craft work￿ (ibid.). Similar changes were implemented for other manual occupations and,
analogously, for non-manual occupations. While a complex coding scheme of this sort allows for very
fine distinctions between different occupations, we are interested in the four main skill categories
provided by ISCO88. In brief, these are: (1) ￿elementary occupations￿ (i..e. ￿manual labor and simple
and routine tasks, involving￿with few exceptions, only limited personal initiative￿ (ILO 1990, p.7));
(2) ￿plant and machine operators and assemblers; craft and related trades workers; skilled agricultural
and fishery workers; service workers and shop and market sales workers; clerks;￿ (3) ￿technicians and
associate professionals;￿ and (4) ￿professionals.￿ A fifth group, ￿legislators, senior officials and
managers,￿ do not have a skill coding under this four-step skill classification and were included as a
separate, fifth, skill category. Finally, we excluded members of the armed forces, since it was unclear
what their skill levels were. 
Unfortunately, our use of the occupational coding in the 1995 ISSP survey created a
complication which had to be faced: the survey which we are using coded occupation in three
different ways, depending on the country in question. The ISCO88 coding scheme was used in 12
cases: Australia, Hungary, Ireland, East and West Germany, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia,
Canada, Russia, Slovakia, and Latvia. The earlier ISCO68 scheme was used in 5 countries: Norway,
New Zealand, Bulgaria, Austria, and USA. Finally, a further 6 countries (Britain, Italy, Netherlands,
Sweden, Japan and the Philippines) used a variety of national coding schemes. Estonia provided no
occupational coding. It was, however, possible to reclassify the ISCO68 countries￿ occupation codes10 We checked whether our results are dependent on our recoding schemes, by running separate
regressions for our 12 ISCO88 countries, and the other 8 countries for which we were able to obtain
skill data. The results (available on request) were reassuringly similar.
11 Details available on request.
12 Although immigration to the US, for example, has become increasingly unskilled in recent decades
(Borjas 1999).
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according to the ISCO88 classification. We were also able to derive an approximation to the ISCO
skill classification from the country-specific occupational codes used in Britain, the Netherlands, and
the Philippines. This left us with skill data for 20 of our 24 countries; we have had to omit the other
four (Estonia, Italy, Sweden and Japan) when estimating models involving skill.
10
 In addition to the foregoing reasonably objective economic variables, we will make use of a
subjective economic variable, namely the stated willingness of people to move from one location to
another in order to improve their standard of living or their work environment. Respondents were
asked: ￿If you could improve your work or living conditions, how willing or unwilling would you be
to move to another neighbourhood or village; another town or city within this county or region;
another county or region; outside [named country]; outside [named continent]?￿ Based on the
responses to these questions, we derived two binary variables, indicating whether or not individuals
were nationally mobile, and internationally mobile.
11 Arguably, those willing to relocate within the
country should be more sanguine about the dislocation implied by free trade than those who are
immobile. The rationale behind including the international mobility variable is to test Rodrik￿s (1997)
argument that globalization is currently favoring internationally mobile factors of production (i.e.
physical and human capital) over immobile factors such as unskilled labor.
12 By the same token, we
also make use of a question which asks whether the respondent had ever lived abroad, on the basis
that previous experience of living abroad may provide a signal regarding willingness to move again.
The ISSP national identity data set includes a wide range of indicators of nationalist attitudes.
Rather than focusing on just one or two of these as indicators of what is, after all, a complex
phenomenon, the approach taken here is to seek to identify an underlying dimension (or dimensions)13 Factor analysis is a generic term often used to cover both principal components analysis and factor
analysis strictly speaking. Both are techniques that can be applied to a set of variables ￿￿when the
researcher is interested in discovering which variables in the set form coherent subsets that are
relatively independent of one another. Variables that are correlated with one another but largely
independent of other subsets of variables are combined into factors. Factors are thought to reflect
underlying processes that have created the correlations among variables￿ (Tabachnick and Fidell
2001, p. 582). 
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of nationalism that would be measured by a subset (or subsets) of the items. An added advantage of
this approach is that using multiple items to measure the same basic concept should improve the
reliability of measurement. Factor analysis provides a statistical means of identifying the
hypothesized dimension or dimensions.
13 A combination of a priori assessment of the individual
items and exploratory factor analysis suggested a strategy of focusing on the following seven items
(versions implemented in Ireland, other country/nationality labels substituted as appropriate): 
￿ ￿Generally speaking, Ireland is a better country than most other countries￿
￿ ￿The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Irish￿
￿ ￿I would rather be a citizen of Ireland than of any other country in the world￿
￿ ￿It is impossible for people who do not share Irish customs and traditions to become fully
Irish￿
￿ ￿People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong￿
￿ ￿Ireland should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations￿
￿ ￿How important do you think each of the following is for being truly Irish?￿... ... ...￿to have
been born in Ireland￿
In each case, respondents were asked to rank their responses along a scale, in the case of the
first six items, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and, in the case of the seventh item,
from 1 (very important) to 4 (not at all important). The seventh item was reordered to make it
consistent with the other six. Principal components analysis of these responses yielded two factors or
underlying dimensions of nationalist attitudes. As can be seen from the rotated factor loadings in14 The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient for the three-item patriotism scale is 0.68 and the item-total
correlations vary from 0.41 to 0.57. The four-item ethnic chauvinism scale is somewhat less satisfactory
in this regard: an alpha of 0.53 and inter-item correlations ranging from 0.31 to 0.36.
15 Nor do we have data on home ownership, another variable which Scheve and Slaughter (2001)
found to be important.
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Table 1, the first factor is a straightforward preference for and sense of the superiority of one￿s own
country (here labeled patriotism). The second factor identifies a narrow or exclusive sense of
nationality combined with a degree of chauvinism of the ￿my country right or wrong￿ variety (here
labeled chauvinism). On the basis of this analysis, patriotism and chauvinism scores have been
calculated by averaging responses across the relevant subsets of items identified in the factor
analysis.
14
Table 2 provides summary statistics for our key variables. As mentioned, ￿Protect￿ ranges
from 1 to 5, as do ￿patriotism￿ and ￿chauvinism￿. ￿Skill￿ also ranges from one to five, reflecting the
fivefold classification above; note, however, that we do not include such a variable in our regression
analyses, since there is no reason to believe that the gap between the first and second skill levels, say,
is equivalent in its effects to the gap between the second and third levels. For this reason, we
incorporate skill into the analysis by introducing a variety of dummy variables. The mobility variables
are both categorical; 0 denotes immobility, and 1 mobility. As the table makes clear, there is a lot of
variation both between and within countries, which Section 4 will exploit.
This brings us to the advantages and disadvantages of our data set compared to the data used
by other authors, and in particular those used by Scheve and Slaughter (2001). The big disadvantage
is that we do not have data on the sector in which respondents are employed; thus, we cannot directly
confront the Heckscher-Ohlin and specific factors world views, as other authors have done.
15 The big
advantage is that we have data for not just one country, but 20. Scheve and Slaughter find that low-
skill workers in the USA favor protection, which is useful evidence consistent with the Heckscher-
Ohlin model; but such a finding on its own does not preclude the possibility that low-skill workers
everywhere have the same attitudes (which would be completely at variance with the predictions of16 For example, it might be the case that better-educated people everywhere are more flexible and
able to cope with the rigors of the market; or even that they are more likely to understand the
intellectual case for free trade.
17 For an introduction, see Greene (2000), Chapter 19.
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such a model).
16 Our data set allows us to explore whether skill has a differential impact on attitudes
across countries, and thus allows for a cleaner test of the Heckscher-Ohlin predictions. Finally, our
data allow us to test these ￿economic￿ relationships while controlling for the effect of variations along
two dimensions of nationalist ideology. 
4. The determinants of attitudes towards protection
We begin by looking at some crude country-level correlations. Table 3 takes the country
means of seven variables (given in Table 2), and calculates the cross-country correlations between
these variables. While this ignores the vast range of variation in attitudes within countries, the data
are nonetheless instructive. Richer countries have higher skill levels, and higher rates of internal
mobility, than poorer countries; they also show more patriotism, and less chauvinism. There is a
strong positive correlation (+0.691) between protectionism and chauvinism, but only a weak
correlation between protectionism and patriotism. Skill, mobility and income per capita are all
associated across countries with pro-free-trade sentiments, rather than with protectionism.
However, our interest is in the determinants of protectionism at the individual level and Table
4 provides some exploratory analysis. In all cases, the dependent variable is ￿protect￿, which as
already mentioned is an ordered variable running from 1 to 5. We therefore used ordered probit
methods in estimating our relationships.
17 In each case, there is assumed to be a latent variable,
PROTECT
*, related to the independent variables as in equation (1):
PROTECTij
* = αi + β1SKILLj + β2SKILLj*GDPCAPi + β3Xij + εij (3)
There are also 4 cutoff points, ￿1-￿4, such that protect takes the value 1 if PROTECT
* lies below ￿1, 214
if PROTECT
* lies between ￿1 and ￿2, 3 if PROTECT
* lies between ￿2 and ￿3, 4 if PROTECT
* lies
between ￿3 and ￿4, and 5 if PROTECT
* lies above ￿4. The disturbance term is assumed to be
normally distributed.
In this model, the probability that protect will take on the value 1, say, is the probability that 
PROTECT
* = β￿Y + ε  < ￿1 (4)
(where Y is the vector of all independent variables), which is equivalent to the probability that
ε < ￿1 - β￿Y (5)
or
φ(￿1 - β￿Y) (6)
where φ is the standard normal distribution. The probabilities that protect will take on any of the
other possible values are similarly constructed: they depend on the respondent￿s characteristics, Y; the
vector of estimated coefficients, β; the cutoff points, which are parameters to be estimated alongside
β; and the standard normal distribution.
It follows that the marginal effect of changing an independent variable on the probability of a
given outcome depends not only on β, but on the standard normal density function evaluated using a
particular choice of Y. A significant positive coefficient implies that changing the relevant
independent variable increases the probability that protect takes on the value 5, and reduces the
probability that protect takes on the value 1. The marginal effect of changing such a variable on the
probability that protect takes on the values 2-4 is, however, a priori unclear. Initially, we will simply
estimate ordered probit models, and will loosely speak of variables being either positively or
negatively related to protectionism; marginal effects will be estimated later.
In nearly all cases, we include a full set of country dummy variables, to take account of
country-level effects operating on all individuals within a country (coefficients not reported). Each
column in Table 4 indicates whether these dummies have been included or not. For all other variables18 We will explore other skill-related specifications later.
19 These are the World Bank￿s data for 1995 PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, in 1995 international
dollars.
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the table reports the coefficient, with the t-statistic in parentheses below.
Equation 1 provides a preliminary examination of the impact of skill. Skill345 is a binary
variable which takes the value 1 if the respondent￿s skill level is either 3, 4 or 5, and zero if his or her
skill level is 1 or 2.
18 In what follows, we will loosely speak of the variable as indicating whether a
respondent is high-skilled or not. The equation relates protectionism not only to this variable, but to
Skill345 interacted with the country￿s GDP per capita (measured in thousands of US dollars).
19 The
results indicate that the high-skilled are more predisposed towards free trade than the low-skilled, and
the interaction term suggests that this effect is greater in rich countries than in poor countries, just as
Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts. Equations 2 through 9 indicate that the latter finding is quite robust
to the inclusion of other variables (although the former is not): since it is the interaction term which is
crucial in testing Heckscher-Ohlin theory, it seems that, so far, preferences are entirely consistent
with that theory.
Equation 2 in Table 4 establishes that patriotism and chauvinism are both positively related to
protectionism, as expected, with chauvinism having a larger impact. A glance across the table
confirms that these findings are also extremely robust to the choice of specification: the hypothesis
that nationalism is an important determinant of attitudes towards trade policy is, on the basis of these
results, confirmed. However, nationalist attitudes are not all-important: taking them into account still
leaves scope for skill differentials to have an effect in ways that, as noted above, are consistent with
economic theory. 
National mobility has no consistent effect on attitudes, which is perhaps a surprise, but those
who consider themselves to be internationally mobile, as well as those who have lived abroad in the
past, are more positively disposed towards trade, supporting Rodrik￿s (1997) arguments. Older people
tend to be more protectionist, as are rural dwellers, women, Roman Catholics, and those in marital20 Data on these variables are not available for all countries.
21 Again, these regional integration questions were only asked in a subset of our countries.
22 An additional country dummy is of course dropped in the specification involving both country
dummies and GDP per capita.
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relationships (although the latter finding is not robust across specifications). There is a statistically
weak but positive link between trade union membership and public sector employment and
protectionism, while the self-employed are more likely to be free traders, as are those who can be
identified as right wing on the basis of the political party they support.
20 The last three variables
measure familiarity with, and attitudes towards, relevant regional associations (e.g. the European
Union in Ireland￿s case). There was a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between
familiarity with the association and protectionism; but those who felt that their country did not benefit
from the association, as well as those who felt that their country should be protecting its
independence, were more likely to be protectionist.
21
Finally, we experimented with our specification by including country GDP per capita, with
and without country dummies.
22 With country dummies omitted, richer countries tend to be associated
with a higher preference for free trade, but this relationship goes away (and indeed the sign of the
coefficient is reversed) when country dummies are introduced. More importantly for our purposes,
the sign of the interaction term between high skills and GDP per capita remains negative and
significant in both these specifications. Another noteworthy feature of these regressions is that when
country dummies are excluded, the coefficient on Roman Catholicism become much larger and more
statistically significant, suggesting that variation in religious beliefs might be explaining cross-
country differences in protectionist attitudes, as well as within-country differences. Roman Catholic
social teaching has traditionally been more skeptical of the market than some brands of Protestantism,
so these correlations make intuitive sense; on the other hand, Catholicism could be proxying across
our set of countries for the Mediterranean region, which might have more protectionist attitudes for
reasons unrelated to religion.23 Country dummies were included for all regressions in Table 5, and Tables 7 through 9.
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Tables 5 and 6 explore the links between skill levels and preferences in greater detail.
23 The
first regression in Table 5 uses five dummy variables reflecting the five skill categories, rather than
the single high-skill variable used in Table 4, and as before introduces them into the regression both
on their own, and interacted with GDP per capita. Using this finer grid does reveal several
relationships consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin theory. Most importantly, the coefficient on Skill1 is
negative, suggesting that the lowest skilled are in favor of free trade; but the interaction term is
positive, suggesting that the association between being low skilled and having protectionist
preferences rises with incomes. The coefficients imply that in countries with per capita incomes
below $11942 in 1995 (roughly $1000 more than incomes in Slovenia), belonging to the lowest skill
category is associated with a preference for free trade, but that in countries with incomes higher than
that amount those in the lowest category are more likely to be protectionist. We take this to be strong
evidence in favor of the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis. A similar sign pattern emerges for Skill2,
although the coefficient on Skill2 itself (as opposed to its interaction term) is statistically
insignificant. For Skill3 and Skill4 (but not Skill5), the sign of the interaction term becomes negative,
again consistent with the theory, although the coefficients are statistically insignificant.
The second regression drops the interaction terms, but allows the coefficient on the high-skill
variable to vary, depending on whether the economy is western, a transition economy, or the
Phillippines. In the West, high skills are strongly associated with a preference for free trade. They are
also strongly associated with such a preference in the transition economies, although the coefficient is
only about half the size as in the West. Finally, the relationship in the Phillippines is insignificant.
Again, this is suggestive evidence in favor of the Heckscher-Ohlin world view.
Table 6 pursues the same issue in a different way, again using the single ￿high-skill￿ dummy
variable. It runs identical regressions (data permitting) for each country individually. While
interesting patterns emerge for several of the other variables, our focus here is on the skill variable.
Figure 1 plots the ￿high-skill￿ coefficient, for each country, against that country￿s GDP per capita. A24 We also ran a regression over the entire sample which included country dummies, the high-skill
variable, and the high-skill variable interacted with country dummies (one country was of course
omitted). The interaction terms were jointly highly statistically significant (and several individual
interaction terms were also statistically significant), indicating that the skill coefficients are indeed
significantly different across countries.
25 Taken from Barro and Lee (2000).
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clear negative association appears between the two variables (the correlation coefficient is -0.634):
that is, the richer the country, the more negative (less positive) is the association between high skills
and protectionist attitudes. To the left of the picture, there is a cluster of poorer countries for which
the coefficient on high skills is either close to zero or positive, while to the right of the picture are the
rich countries in which high skills are clearly associated with a preference for free trade, rather than
protection.
24
Again, we take Figure 1 to be strong evidence in favor of the Heckscher-Ohlin perspective.
Of course, it might be objected that high skills are only associated with protectionism in 3 countries,
and that the t-statistics fall below conventional levels in all three cases (see Table 6); but we think
that there is a convincing counter-argument (already suggested in Section 2), which, however, we are
unable to provide evidence for given our current dataset. Our sample of countries, while 20 times
bigger than the samples used in previous studies, only contains 20 countries. There are many, poorer
countries in which the high-skilled might be even more protectionist than in Bulgaria and Slovakia:
one could imagine the negatively sloped relationship in Figure 1 extending further to the left, with the
countries of the world as a whole more evenly divided between those where skills are associated with
protectionism, and those where skills are associated with liberal attitudes towards trade. Of course,
this is pure speculation on our part: nonetheless, the results we are able to obtain from these data
seem entirely consistent with the insights of Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin.
 The evidence in Figure 2, which plots the same coefficients against the average years of
schooling in each country,
25 is less compelling. The correlation is much weaker (-0.0993), and this is
disturbing, since theory says that attitudes should be related to factor endowments, rather than income
per capita. (The rationale for using income per capita is thus that it is correlated with the skill level of26 The Phillippines is not included in either sample.
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the population.) As can be seen from the figure, however, the Barro-Lee figures for schooling in
several transition countries are very high: for example, average schooling is higher in Slovakia,
Bulgaria, Latvia and Poland than in the Netherlands, Ireland, and Austria. We doubt whether these
figures provide a genuine reflection of the economically relevant human capital endowments of these
economies, and thus doubt the usefulness of Figure 2 as a test of Heckscher-Ohlin theory.
Leaving aside the testing of trade theory for a moment, what other insights can be gleaned
from Table 6? Patriotism and chauvinism are significantly related to protectionist attitudes in
virtually all countries, with the size of the coefficients being fairly consistent throughout. Clearly, our
findings regarding nationalism and trade policy preferences reflect a quite general phenomenon (at
least in this sample of countries), rather than depending on strong correlations in a few countries.
There are several exceptions to the general rule that the old are more protectionist: they are
significantly more likely to favor free trade in East Germany, Poland and Estonia, all former
Communist countries; and coefficients are statistically insignificant in several countries. The finding
that women tend to be more protectionist than men is, however, a fairly general one.
Table 7 investigates the data further, by estimating models separately for various sub-samples
of the data. The first four columns take a further look at cross-country variations in the data by
splitting the sample into its western and former Communist components.
26 The high-skill coefficient
in column 2 is positive (and statistically significant at the 10% level) in the east, and the interaction
term between skills and GDP is negative and significant, consistent with both Heckscher-Ohlin theory
and Figure 1. The results in column 2 suggest that in countries with per capita incomes below $4215
(slightly lower than the Russian income) high-skilled workers are more likely to be protectionist,
whereas they are more likely to support free trade in countries with higher incomes. The interaction
term is insignificant within the west, which is again consistent with Figure 1: there may be too little
variation in the western data to pick up any relationship here.
The impact of gender appears to be much stronger in the west, although it is still strong in the27 Moreover, the gender effect remains unchanged when a labor force dummy variable is included in
the model, estimated over the full sample (results available on request). We counted those in full-time
and part-time work, as well as the unemployed, as being in the labor force. We could also have
included those working less than 15 hours a week, and relatives assisting, but there were too few
respondents in these categories (less than 500 across all countries) for this to be worthwhile.
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east (consistent with Blanchflower (2001), who finds that women are less satisfied with democracy);
but age appears only to affect attitudes in the east. Unemployment is weakly associated with
protectionist attitudes in the west, but not at all in the east: attitudes towards being unemployed may
be quite different in a society undergoing rapid structural change than in a typical western economy.
Interestingly, the impact of being rural appears to be almost identical in east and west: this is at odds
with the intuition that western farmers should be more protectionist, since they are less competitive
and more dependent on protection than their eastern counterparts. Of course agriculture is not the
only rural industry, but it is the main one; the data are consistent with other rural characteristics of a
sociological or even cultural nature driving these correlations.
We estimated the model for men and women separately; the results are given in columns 5
and 6. The most notable difference to our mind is that while age appears to matter for men, it does not
matter for women. We were also interested in whether the gender effect was due to the fact that
women are less likely to be in the labor force than men. We therefore estimated the model separately
for those in the labor force and those outside it; the results (given in Table 8) suggest that the gender
effect is not due to lower female labor force participation, since the gender effect is actually stronger
for those in the labor force than for those outside it.
27
The last two columns in Table 7 address the issue of whether those reporting themselves to be
immobile (within the country) are less influenced by their skill type than those who are mobile; the
reason for the question is that, arguably, the immobile should care more about their sector of
employment (assuming that regions are largely dominated by particular industries). The hypothesis is
rejected in that the interaction between skills and GDP per capita (the test of Heckscher-Ohlin theory)
is even stronger for the immobile than for the mobile. (We also experimented by including interaction
terms between skill and mobility in various models: but these interaction terms are always28 Indeed, labor economists have found that the ￿returns to experience obtained under communism
fell during the transition￿ (Svejnar 1999, p. 2839).
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insignificant.)
Finally, Table 9 explores the effect of age on protectionist attitudes in greater detail.
Consistent with our expectations, age squared has a negative coefficient, suggesting that the marginal
effect of age declines as respondents get older. Age remains insignificant in the west, but important in
the east: could it be that the overall correlation between age and attitudes is simply being driven by
the length of time over which east-bloc respondents were exposed to Communist ideology? Two
pieces of evidence suggest not. First, columns 4-6 in Table 9 introduce an interaction term between
skill and age. In the west, the term is negative (and significant at the 12.5% level), suggesting that the
high-skilled become more pro-free trade the older they get. If respondents￿ human capital increases
with age, as the labor economics literature suggests, then this is precisely what one would expect. On
the other hand, in the east the high-skilled become more protectionist the older they get; which is
consistent with the skills acquired under Communism being largely irrelevant to a modern economy,
and to these individuals￿ position in society being threatened by liberalization.
28 The second piece of
evidence suggesting that age is influencing attitudes through economic channels is given in Table 8: it
shows that the impact of age on protectionist attitudes is much larger for those in the labor force than
for those not in it.
So much for statistical significance: what about the quantitative impact of these variables on
attitudes towards protection? In order to answer this question, we began by estimating the model in
column 4 of Table 4, and then set all right hand side variables equal to their median values. Having
done that, we calculated the impact of changing each individual independent variable on the
probabilities that ￿protect￿ would take on each of the values 1 to 5. For binary variables, we
considered the impact of changing the variable from zero to one; for other variables we explored
more complicated changes, as discussed below.
Our point estimates of the coefficients and cutoff points, together with the assumption that29 All results were produced using Clarify, as described in Tomz, Wittenberg and King (1999) and
King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000).
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other variables are set equal to their median values, produce a point estimate of the impact of
changing a given independent variable on the dependent variable. On the other hand, our coefficients
are estimated with uncertainty. We therefore estimated our impact effects with 95% confidence
intervals, to reflect the fact that different samples would have produced different coefficient
estimates.
29 The results are given in Table 10.
The first panel simply presents the simulated probabilities that an observation will take on
any of the five values of the dependent variable, protect. As can be seen, there is nearly a 20%
probability that protect takes on the value 3, a 38% probability that it takes on the value 4, and a 31%
probability that it takes on the value 5. The panels immediately below indicate the impact of changing
our nationalism variables on all five probabilities; in the following discussion we focus on the
probability that protect takes on the value five. Increasing patriotism from its 40
th to its 60
th percentile
increases the probability that protect take on the value 5 by 2 percentage points, with a 95%
confidence interval of 1.79 to 2.28 percentage points. Changing chauvinism from its 40
th to 60
th
percentile increases the probability that protect takes on its highest value by 5.8 percentage points. If
these two variables are changed from their 20
th to their 80
th percentiles, the impact on protect is
enormous: the probability of the most protectionist response occurring increases by 10.1 percentage
points in the case of patriotism, an increase of 32% over the benchmark simulated probability. In the
case of chauvinism, the impact is to increase the probability that protect equals five by 19.8
percentage points, an increase of 64% (with a 95% confidence interval of 18.4 to 21.2 percentage
points). These are huge effects by any standards.
No other variable has an impact as big as chauvinism, although some come close. The
interaction term between high-skill and GDP per capita in the equation indicates that the effect of
being high-skilled on protectionist attitudes depends on how rich the country is. The next three panels
therefore indicate the impact of being high-skilled in economies with GDPs per capita of $5000,23
$15000 and $25000 respectively. As the regression results (and Heckscher-Ohlin logic) suggest, the
impact on protectionism is much greater in the richer countries. Thus, the probability that protect is 5
declines by only 2.3 percentage points in the poorest country, but by 5.5 percentage points in the
middle-income country, and by 8.4 percentage points in the rich country (a fall of 27%). Clearly, skill
has a large effect on preferences in rich countries.
The only other variable to matter to this extent was gender: being a woman increases the
probability of the most protectionist response by 7.4 percentage points, or 24%. This is clearly a large
effect. Being internationally mobile reduces the probability that protect takes on the value five by 4
percentage points, while never having lived abroad increases that probability by almost the same
amount (3.6 percentage points). The other variables do not have a particularly large effect on
attitudes.
We then generated the simulated probabilities implied by the model given in column 5 of
Table 4. This allowed us to explore the impact of further variables, not available for all countries, on
preferences. The simulated probability that protect would take on the value 5 was equal to nearly
26%; being a rural dweller increases this probability by 4.4 percentage points, but being unemployed
only increases it (surprisingly, it might be argued) by 2.1 percentage points. Belonging to a trade
union has almost no impact on attitudes, which again seems surprising; but being self-employed
reduces the probability of an extreme protectionist response by some 2.6 percentage points.
5. What have we learned?
There are a number of key results from this study.
First, protectionist attitudes are strongly related to both patriotism and chauvinism; this is a
quite general result across countries, and the effect is quantitatively as well as statistically significant.
To that extent, it would appear that trade policy preferences are heavily influenced by non-economic,
in this case cultural or ideological, factors. Nationalism is, of course, a complex phenomenon with
many roots, including, as noted above, adverse economic experiences and conditions. A totally30 Similarly, Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato find that Latin American men are more likely to
have pro-market attitudes (Graham and Pettinato 2001), and to agree with the proposition that trade is
￿very important￿ to their country￿s prosperity (Graham and Pettinato forthcoming).
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economic-determinist or reductionist explanation of nationalism is, however, implausible. It seems
safe, therefore, to conclude that nationalist attitudes exercise some autonomous influence and are a
significant factor in the genesis of protectionist policy preferences.
The second result is that, even when cultural or ideological factors are taken into account,
skill matters for policy preferences, and the effect that skill has on those preferences varies across
countries in ways which are consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin theory. Roughly speaking, in countries
with per capita incomes below $12000 the lowest skilled tend to be more in favor of free trade, while
they tend to be more protectionist in countries above that income threshold. Belonging to one of the
higher skill categories only shifts attitudes in a slightly more liberal direction in poor countries; the
effect is a large one in rich countries. Finally, there seems to be a strong negative relationship
between the impact of skills on protectionist attitudes, on the one hand, and income per capita on the
other. That is, high skills are generally associated with a preference for free trade, and this effect is
stronger in richer countries than in poorer countries. Indeed, in some of the poorest countries in our
truncated sample, high skills are, albeit weakly, associated with a preference for protection.
Third, we have found evidence of a pronounced gender gap regarding trade policy
preferences, which is quantitatively important and apparently consistent across countries. We have no
explanation for this phenomenon, though we note that it is consistent with findings regarding the
persistence of gender differences in support for European integration even after controlling for the
effects of a wide range of other variables (Wessels, 1995, 111-114).
30
In terms of the economic debates surrounding the determinants of protectionist attitudes, we
have, as stated, found evidence broadly consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin viewpoint. What we
have not been able to do, given the data we are currently working with, is to compare the impact of
skills on protectionist attitudes with the impact of the sector of employment. Nor have we been able
to follow Scheve and Slaughter in exploring the impact of home ownership. We will shortly have25
access to a dataset from the Republic of Ireland that includes both these variables, and we intend to
pursue these questions via this avenue; unfortunately, that analysis, like that of Scheve and Slaughter,
will lack a cross-country comparative dimension. However, it is our intention in the future to organize
the collection of relevant data across a broad range of countries that will allow us to address all these
issues on an appropriate comparative scale.26
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Table 1:  Factor analysis of nationalist items in ISSP National Identity Survey 1995
Factor 1 Factor 2
[COUNTRY] better country than most other countries 0.86 0.02
World better place if people from other countries more like the 0.78 0.2
Rather be citizen of [COUNTRY] than of any other country in world 0.61 0.29
Impossible for people who do not share [NATNL.]traditions to be fully -0.01 0.71
People should support their country even if country is wrong 0.20 0.63
Importance of having been born in [COUNTRY] to be fully [NATIONALITY] 0.16 0.63
[COUNTRY] should follow own interests, even if conflicts with other nations 0.23 0.55
Percent variance 26.34 24.50
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser
Normalization.
Source:  Data from ISSP National Identity Survey 1995Table 2. Summary statistics, selected variables
Country Variable Protect Patriotism Chauvinism Skill Nat.mobility Int.mobility
Australia Obs 2398 2398 2339 2181 2407 2404 
Australia Mean 3.997 3.956 2.952 2.934 0.619 0.204 
Australia Std.dev. 0.988 0.677 0.862 1.262 0.486 0.403 
W.Germany Obs 1255  1248  1234 709 1171  1193 
W.  Germany Mean 3.083 3.089 2.672 2.677 0.638 0.220 
W.  Germany Std.dev. 1.232 0.922 0.960 1.074 0.481 0.415 
E.  Germany Obs 604 596 589 306 569 577 
E.  Germany Mean 3.563 3.136 2.818 2.699 0.571 0.125 
E.  Germany Std.dev. 1.189 0.900 0.957 1.063 0.495 0.331 
Britain Obs 1043 1029 1016 1006  974  982 
Britain Mean 3.723 3.535 3.322 2.613 0.574 0.231 
Britain Std.dev. 1.004 0.817 0.830 1.174 0.495 0.422 
USA Obs 1343 1348 1281 1300 1336 1340 
USA Mean 3.707 3.972 3.113 2.746 0.738 0.166 
USA Std.dev. 1.016 0.705 0.841 1.204 0.440 0.373 
Austria Obs 1007  1007  1007 505 1007  1007 
Austria Mean 3.873 3.871 3.422 2.638 0.393 0.127 
Austria Std.dev. 1.163 0.820 0.888 1.256 0.489 0.333 
Hungary Obs 998 995 996 913 997  1000 
Hungary Mean 4.047 3.285 3.430 2.318 0.311 0.094 
Hungary Std.dev. 1.075 0.779 0.805 1.082 0.463 0.292 
Italy Obs 1093  1090  1090 0 1091  1094 
Italy Mean 3.571 3.067 3.112  0.630 0.224 
Italy Std.dev. 1.216 0.873 0.778  0.483 0.417 
Ireland Obs 991 994 988 908 987 986 
Ireland Mean 3.650 3.729 3.342 2.439 0.421 0.173 
Ireland Std.dev. 1.128 0.684 0.709 1.171 0.494 0.379 
Netherlands Obs 2071 2070 2052 1702 2035 2048 
Netherlands Mean 2.912 3.065 2.881 2.791 0.639 0.250 
Netherlands Std.dev. 0.992 0.789 0.812 1.018 0.480 0.433 
Norway Obs 1494 1492 1458 1280 1485 1491 
Norway Mean 3.144 3.537 3.144 2.665 0.602 0.192 
Norway Std.dev. 1.038 0.739 0.846 1.121 0.490 0.394 
Sweden Obs 1284  1274  1265 0 1245  1265 
Sweden Mean 3.228 3.290 3.042  0.590 0.288 
Sweden Std.dev. 1.081 0.800 0.869  0.492 0.453 
Czech  Rep. Obs 1109  1111  1099 970 1068  1104 
Czech  Rep. Mean 3.415 3.110 3.129 2.533 0.488 0.121 
Czech  Rep. Std.dev. 1.294 0.806 0.817 1.041 0.500 0.327 
Slovenia Obs 1036  1035  1035 823 1036  1036 
Slovenia Mean 3.465 3.229 3.292 2.350 0.378 0.125 
Slovenia Std.dev. 1.174 0.792 0.791 0.992 0.485 0.330 
Poland Obs 1582 1573 1556 1454 1094 1564 
Poland Mean 3.787 3.456 3.458 2.221 0.441 0.187 
Poland Std.dev. 1.083 0.731 0.714 0.914 0.497 0.390 
Bulgaria Obs 1102  1098  1095 996 1097  1099 
Bulgaria Mean 4.190 3.582 3.998 2.228 0.418 0.257 
Bulgaria Std.dev. 1.090 0.865 0.750 1.130 0.493 0.437 
Russia Obs 1585  1585  1585 807 1585  1585 
Russia Mean 3.670 3.297 3.517 2.530 0.218 0.107 
Russia Std.dev. 1.282 0.831 0.805 1.067 0.413 0.310 
New  Zealand Obs 1019  1015 996  633 1018  1021 
New  Zealand Mean 3.406 3.798 3.060 2.866 0.623 0.245 
New  Zealand Std.dev. 1.147 0.693 0.798 1.263 0.485 0.430 
Canada Obs 1525  1527  1496 923 1519  1519 
Canada Mean 3.264 3.831 2.707 3.115 0.722 0.286 
Canada Std.dev. 1.135 0.823 0.809 0.963 0.448 0.452 
Phillippines Obs 1200  1200  1198 633 1200  1200 
Phillippines Mean 3.624 3.613 3.430 1.790 0.469 0.279 
Phillippines Std.dev. 0.918 0.633 0.564 0.897 0.499 0.449 
Japan Obs 1252  1252  1247 0 1256  1256 
Japan Mean 2.919 3.931 2.890  0.318 0.076 
Japan Std.dev. 1.282 0.740 0.950  0.466 0.265 
Estonia Obs 1221  1221  1221 0 1221  1221 
Estonia Mean 3.813 3.260 3.362  0.498 0.215 
Estonia Std.dev. 0.906 0.760 0.692  0.500 0.411 
Latvia Obs 1041  1026  1026 434 1027  1035 
Latvia Mean 4.042 3.146 3.252 2.816 0.251 0.135 
Latvia Std.dev. 1.180 0.831 0.828 1.136 0.434 0.342 
Slovakia Obs 1388 1388 1388 1222 1359 1388 
Slovakia Mean 3.488 3.029 2.851 2.265 0.531 0.241 
Slovakia Std.dev. 1.273 0.906 0.926 0.982 0.499 0.428 
Source:  Data from ISSP National Identity Survey 199531




Skill Nat.mobilityInt.mobility GDP per
capita
Protect 1.000 
Patriotism 0.127 1.000 
Chauvinism 0.691 0.105  1.000 
Skill -0.271 0.223  -0.590 1.000 
Nat. mobility -0.376  0.126  -0.572  0.468  1.000 
Int.mobility -0.151 0.012  -0.120 0.003  0.633  1.000 
GDP per capita -0.482  0.383  -0.582  0.672  0.664  0.080  1.000 
Source: see text.32
Table 4. Exploratory regressions: ordered probit
Dependent variable is protect. Country dummy coefficients not reported
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Country dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
GDPCAP -0.0163 0.0034 
(-13.2) (1.47)
Patriotism 0.1946 0.1722 0.1750 0.1734 0.1864 0.1527 0.2077  0.1750 
(20.35) (17.34) (17.14) (12.55) (14.05) (11.34) (22.04) (17.14)
Chauvinism 0.3369 0.3293 0.3301 0.3183 0.3594 0.3176 0.3382  0.3301 
(36.45) (34.8) (33.85) (23.7) (28.96) (23.43) (36.27) (33.85)
Skill345 -0.0816 -0.0169 0.0070 -0.0204  -0.0913 -0.0713 0.0558 -0.0353  -0.0204 
(-2.16) (-0.44) (0.18) (-0.51) (-1.81) (-1.28) (1.04) (-0.92) (-0.51)
Skill345*GDPCAP -0.0137 -0.0104 -0.0109 -0.0095 -0.0055 -0.0074 -0.0115 -0.0039 -0.0095 
(-6.36) (-4.75) (-4.88) (-4.16) (-1.74) (-2.50) (-3.30) (-1.80) (-4.16)
National mobility -0.0174  -0.0048  0.0181  -0.0113  0.0095  0.0313  -0.0048 
(-1.18) (-0.31) (0.86) (-0.56) (0.45) (2.05) (-0.31)
International mobility -0.1325  -0.1179  -0.1174  -0.1218  -0.0890  -0.1025  -0.1179 
(-7.22) (-6.2) (-4.68) (-4.97) (-3.47) (-5.46) (-6.2)
Never lived abroad 0.1132  0.1043  0.1141  0.1015  0.0848  0.0234  0.1043 
(6.35) (5.64) (4.67) (4.46) (3.29) (1.31) (5.64)
Age 0.0014 0.0027 0.0022 0.0008 0.0022 0.0014 
(2.98) (3.51) (3.55) (1.21) (4.72) (2.98)
Woman 0.2222 0.2243 0.2592 0.1863 0.2251 0.2222 
(15.96) (11.66) (14.48) (9.72) (16.31) (15.96)
Married 0.0333 0.0002 0.0233 0.0446 0.0156 0.0333 
(2.24) (0.01) (1.21) (2.23) (1.07) (2.24)
Catholic 0.0667 0.0469 0.0652 0.1155 0.1302 0.0667 













Familiar with regional association (RA) -0.0239 
(-1.17)
No benefit from RA 0.1364 
(8.97)
Stay independent from RA 0.0883 
(6.15)
Cut1 -1.7205 -0.2570 -0.2796  -0.0497  -0.2597 -0.2467 0.2368 0.0086 0.0260 
Cut2 -0.8396 0.6801 0.6610 0.9021 0.7886 0.7804 1.1959 0.9344 0.9258 
Cut3 -0.1743 1.3880 1.3734 1.6196 1.4807 1.4728 1.8647 1.6238 1.6433 
Cut4 0.7632 2.3855 2.3719 2.6212  2.5015 2.5335 2.8431  2.5851  2.6449 
No. obs. 26827  26365  25273  24278  13009  14737  13282  24278  24278 
LR chi2 3258.61  6151  6038.6  6065.92  3116.12  4320.99  3483.05  4488.98  6065.92 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  0  0 
Pseudo R2 0.0407  0.0781  0.0799  0.0835  0.0804  0.0979  0.0873  0.0618  0.0835 
Loglikelihood -38412.2 -36294.3 -34784.6 -33281.2  -17815.5 -19904.5 -18216.6  -34069.7 -33281.2
Source: see text. T-statistics are in parentheses.33
Table 5. Different specifications of skill
Dependent variable is protect. Country dummies included (coefficients not reported)
Variable (1) (2)
Patriotism 0.175 0.175 
(17.16) (17.12)




























National mobility -0.005  -0.005 
(-0.35) (-0.33)
International mobility -0.117  -0.118 
(-6.16) (-6.20) 
Never lived abroad 0.102  0.104 
(5.50) (5.61)
Age 0.002 0.001 
(3.37) (2.90)
Woman 0.220 0.222 
(15.69) (15.97) 
Married 0.031 0.033 
(2.07) (2.25)
Catholic 0.065 0.067 
(3.29) (3.36)
Cut1 -0.063 -0.055 
Cut2 0.890 0.897 
Cut3 1.608 1.615 
Cut4 2.610 2.616 
Number of obs  24278.000  24278.000 
LR chi2 6097.800  6059.440 
Prob > chi2    0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2      0.084  0.083 
Log likelihood -33265.257 -33284.436
Source: see text. T-statistics are in parentheses.34
Table 6. Country-specific models





Britain USA Austria Hungary Italy
Patriotism 0.240 0.128 0.246 0.159 0.286 0.057 0.053 0.174
(5.63) (2.07) (2.52) (2.78) (5.39) (1.09) (0.98) (3.91)
Chauvinism 0.344 0.425 0.433 0.510 0.419 0.454 0.225 0.299
(9.76) (7.12) (4.85) (9.18) (9.54) (8.97) (4.62) (6.01)
Skill345 -0.216 -0.318 -0.191 -0.352 -0.300 -0.201 -0.035
(-4.04) (-3.59) (-1.40) (-4.38) (-4.58) (-2.20) (-0.41)
National mobility 0.029 -0.215 -0.338 0.089 0.056 -0.158 -0.052 0.069
(0.51) (-2.23) (-2.38) (1.08) (0.74) (-1.94) (-0.62) (0.94)
International mobility -0.119 -0.187 -0.123 -0.124 0.001 -0.154 -0.160 -0.027
(-1.76) (-1.77) (-0.63) (-1.28) (0.01) (-1.33) (-1.22) (-0.31)
Never lived abroad 0.102 0.188 0.443 0.073 0.099 0.174 -0.103 0.271
(1.81) (1.66) (1.47) (0.84) (1.31) (1.77) (-0.73) (2.64)
Age 0.003 -0.002 -0.013 0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.000
(1.66) (-0.37) (-1.96) (1.08) (1.18) (-1.38) (1.90) (0.19)
Woman 0.333 0.405 0.680 0.191 0.155 0.311 0.074 0.215
(6.29) (4.53) (5.06) (2.54) (2.44) (4.34) (0.98) (3.28)
Married -0.060 -0.199 0.125 0.005 0.113 0.180 0.010 0.152
(-0.99) (-2.06) (0.82) (0.07) (1.79) (2.44) (0.14) (2.09)
Catholic 0.083 0.014 -0.166 0.077 -0.031 -0.076 -0.033 -0.130
(1.33) (0.16) (-0.46) (0.61) (-0.42) (-0.83) (-0.42) (-0.84)
Cut1 -0.321  -0.177  0.047  -0.100   0.529  -0.173 -0.961   0.228
Cut2  0.863   0.971 1.255   1.228  1.431   0.750 -0.291   1.050
Cut3   1.401   1.728 1.912   2.040  2.223   1.267  0.468  1.567
Cut4  2.679   2.716 2.888   3.325  3.546   2.226  1.172  2.535
Number of obs    1827    648    285    906   1225     985     930    1084
LR chi2 313.120  179.890  104.600  243.020  276.110    226.380   50.160   124.830
Prob > chi2    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000   0.000
Pseudo R2      0.067  0.091  0.120  0.098  0.083    0.083  0.021   0.039
Log likelihood -2164.910  -899.460  -385.137  -1113.125-1535.116 -1255.603 -1188.651 -1553.800
Source: see text. T-statistics are in parentheses.35
Table 6. (Continued)
Dependent variable is protect.
Variable Ireland Netherland
s
Norway Sweden Czech. Rep. Slovenia Poland Bulgaria
Patriotism 0.197 0.073 0.218 0.337 0.154 0.254 0.171 0.103
(3.33) (2.01) (4.51) (7.26) (3.12) (4.59) (2.94) (2.14)
Chauvinism 0.335 0.480 0.281 0.352 0.318 0.357 0.231 0.397
(5.63) (12.71) (6.83) (8.39) (6.82) (6.57) (3.99) (7.41)
Skill345 -0.233 -0.170 -0.217 -0.212 -0.407 -0.009 0.128
(-2.81) (-3.19) (-3.56) (-2.85) (-4.97) (-0.11) (1.50)
National mobility -0.038 -0.036 -0.098 -0.113 -0.068 -0.090 -0.009 0.017
(-0.44) (-0.65) (-1.52) (-1.62) (-0.94) (-1.09) (-0.11) (0.21)
International mobility -0.110 -0.087 -0.281 -0.275 -0.125 -0.109 -0.034 -0.219
(-1.01) (-1.35) (-3.43) (-3.45) (-1.10) (-0.90) (-0.35) (-2.29)
Never lived abroad 0.139 0.123 0.160 0.135 0.034 0.069 0.142 0.161
(1.72) (1.78) (2.21) (1.79) (0.33) (0.77) (1.29) (1.43)
Age -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.010 -0.001 -0.005 0.002
(-0.88) (0.69) (-0.16) (2.68) (4.23) (-0.21) (-2.11) (0.87)
Woman 0.371 0.335 0.235 0.506 0.217 0.109 0.034 0.019
(4.96) (6.59) (4.11) (8.00) (3.17) (1.48) (0.47) (0.27)
Married -0.035 0.111 0.038 -0.070 0.032 -0.082 -0.102 0.139
(-0.45) (2.07) (0.59) (-1.02) (0.44) (-0.97) (-1.30) (1.74)
Catholic 0.051 0.061 -0.923 -0.164 0.095 0.064 0.057 -0.573
(0.35) (0.95) (-2.27) (-0.46) (1.32) (0.72) (0.54) (-0.97)
Cut1  -0.149   0.097 -0.150   0.783  0.563 -0.071  -0.724   0.454
Cut2   1.147   1.551  1.072   1.769  1.315  1.171  0.198  0.750
Cut3   1.510   2.503   2.050  2.885  1.929  1.873  0.894  1.445
Cut4   2.679   3.794  3.228  3.990  2.709  2.702  1.838  2.181
Number of obs      866   1827   1391   1186    994    876     951   1050
LR chi2  126.500 372.290  263.010  383.120  177.000  186.410    58.420  132.090
Prob > chi2     0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000
Pseudo R2       0.053 0.074  0.067  0.110  0.057  0.071   0.022  0.053
Log likelihood -1133.695  -2325.767 -1845.643 -1547.066  -1461.511  -1214.625 -1320.243 -1192.092
Source: see text. T-statistics are in parentheses.36
Table 6. (Continued)
Dependent variable is protect.
Russia New Zealand Canada Phillippine
s
Japan Estonia Latvia Slovakia
Patriotism 0.201 0.120 0.117 0.127 0.142 0.135 0.140 0.288
(3.96) (2.12) (2.24) (1.79) (2.96) (2.67) (1.90) (6.94)
Chauvinism 0.323 0.400 0.354 0.103 0.312 0.295 0.237 0.171
(6.31) (8.05) (6.47) (1.31) (8.16) (5.22) (3.22) (4.46)
Skill345 -0.237 -0.246 -0.129 -0.030 0.030 0.078
(-2.96) (-3.04) (-1.48) (-0.19) (0.26) (1.11)
National mobility 0.182 -0.035 0.121 0.205 -0.004 0.162 0.012 0.025
(1.97) (-0.44) (1.27) (2.18) (-0.06) (2.14) (0.10) (0.39)
International mobility -0.165 0.005 -0.142 0.030 -0.124 0.083 -0.217 -0.137
(-1.34) (0.06) (-1.54) (0.29) (-1.03) (0.91) (-1.39) (-1.81)
Never lived abroad -0.187 0.140 0.028 -0.091 0.091 -0.153 0.162 0.120
(-1.05) (1.86) (0.33) (-0.58) (0.66) (-1.53) (1.21) (1.20)
Age 0.013 0.007 -0.005 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 0.014 0.004
(3.53) (2.88) (-1.31) (-0.13) (-1.46) (-2.58) (2.70) (2.03)
Woman 0.201 0.242 0.169 0.083 0.389 0.127 0.003 0.133
(2.58) (3.37) (2.12) (0.89) (6.32) (1.96) (0.03) (2.25)
Married 0.218 -0.177 0.090 0.071 -0.070 0.138 -0.179 0.038
(2.58) (-2.27) (1.03) (0.68) (-0.99) (2.00) (-1.43) (0.62)
Catholic -0.070 0.187 -0.053 0.415 0.433 0.376 0.087
(-0.69) (2.24) (-0.45) (1.09) (3.72) (2.47) (1.44)
Cut1 0.653 0.222 -0.305  -1.653  0.619  -0.770  0.124  0.285 
Cut2 1.486  1.285  0.767 -0.121 1.127 0.375 0.786 1.050 
Cut3 2.053  1.931  1.536 0.442 2.099 1.107 1.264 1.651 
Cut4 2.774  3.001  2.591 1.968 2.718 2.543 1.834 2.455 
Number of obs  821  893  727  630  1228  1184  418  1346 
LR  chi2 127.990  159.410  81.440  14.850 166.810  107.660 47.200 204.910 
Prob > chi2    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.138  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2      0.052  0.060  0.038  0.010  0.044  0.036  0.041  0.049 
Log  likelihood -1177.318 -1252.144 -1034.937 -775.849 -1817.111  -1425.143  -546.282 -1970.547
Source: see text. T-statistics are in parentheses.37
Table 7. Sensitivity analysis
Dependent variable is protect. Country dummies included (coefficients not reported)
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)






Patriotism 0.1672 0.1809 0.1699 0.1670 0.1772 0.1793 0.1760 0.1710
(13.08) (10.18) (9.42) (7.20) (12.36) (12.26) (11.45) (12.42)
Chauvinism 0.3692 0.2766 0.3463 0.2938 0.3340 0.3250 0.3240 0.3350
(30.64) (16.01) (20.17) (12.85) (24.37) (23.33) (22.61) (25.07)
Skill345 -0.1647 0.1037 -0.6101 0.1192 -0.0840 0.0517 0.0240 -0.0640
(-1.01) (1.66) (-1.83) (1.24) (-1.41) (0.96) (0.44) (-1.08)
Skill345*GDPCAP -0.0027 -0.0246 0.0205 -0.0329 -0.0110 -0.0079 -0.0128 -0.0067
(-0.35) (-3.33) (1.24) (-2.53) (-3.26) (-2.55) (-3.74) (-2.08)
National mobility -0.0089 -0.0080 0.0260 -0.0071 -0.0111 -0.0003
(-0.46) (-0.29) (0.96) (-0.20) (-0.50) (-0.02)
International
mobility
-0.1150 -0.1380 -0.1380 -0.1195 -0.0936 -0.1476 -0.1510 -0.1230
(-5.01) (-3.78) (-4.47) (-2.43) (-3.54) (-5.37) (-3.55) (-5.69)
Never lived abroad  0.1200 0.0861 0.1501 0.0574 0.1483 0.0646 0.1090 0.1010
(5.63) (2.19) (5.24) (1.12) (5.85) (2.38) (3.82) (4.14)
Age 0.0003 0.0038 0.0015 0.0052 0.0027 0.0008 0.0010 0.0020
(0.50) (4.28) (1.51) (3.85) (3.80) (1.22) (2.06) (2.32)
Woman 0.2810 0.1187 0.3143 0.1041 0.1970 0.2490
(16.42) (4.70) (12.74) (3.11) (9.61) (13.03)
Married 0.0282 0.0487 -0.0242 0.0275 0.0125 0.0349 0.0610 0.0040
(.54) (1.82) (-0.91) (0.74) (0.54) (1.74) (2.76) (0.20)
Catholic 0.0472 0.0887 0.0593 0.0217 0.0852 0.0478 0.0680 0.0610









Trade union 0.0069 0.0100
(1.40) (0.75)
Cut1 0.0053 0.1404 -0.4000 -0.1878 0.0844 -0.4003 -0.0110 -0.0910
Cut2 1.0338 0.9306 0.7877 0.6078 1.0380 0.5692 0.8790 0.9080
Cut3 1.8017 1.5632 1.5314 1.2312 1.6756 1.3776 1.6260 1.6040
Cut4 2.9218 2.3338 2.6924 2.0111 2.6575 2.4011 2.5560 2.6810
No.obs. 15977 7671 7887 4492 11811 12467 11499 12779
LRchi2 4556.3 1381.3 2058.3 833.9 3134.7 2822.2 2658.9 3280.1
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PseudoR2 0.0957 0.0610 0.0885 0.0632 0.0866 0.0782 0.0780 0.0850
Loglikelihood -21523.6 -10640.3 -10595.9 -6176.5 -16522.4 -16631.2 -15622.3 -17579.1 
Source: see text. T-statistics are in parentheses.38
Table 8. Sensitivity analysis: labour force participation
Dependent variable is protect. Country dummies included (coefficients not reported)
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
In labour force? In LF In LF In LF Not in LF Not in LF Not in LF
Sample All West only East only All West only East only
Patriotism 0.1756 0.1521 0.2029 0.1780 0.2019 0.1239 
(14.03) (9.43) (9.64) (9.97) (9.53) (3.68)
Chauvinism 0.3290 0.3718 0.2776 0.3309 0.3605 0.2789 
(27.60) (24.69) (13.58) (19.31) (17.75) (8.57)
Skill345 -0.0661  -0.1692 0.0337 0.1704 0.1633 0.3667 
(-1.46) (-0.87) (0.50) (1.95) (0.50) (1.86)
Skill345*GDPCAP -0.0076 -0.0029 -0.0193 -0.0177 -0.0167 -0.0498 
(-2.90) (-0.31) (-2.48) (-3.61) (-1.07) (-1.99)
National  mobility 0.0019  0.0098 -0.0283 -0.0243 -0.0467 0.0364 
(0.10) (0.40) (-0.87) (-0.89) (-1.49) (0.65)
International  mobility -0.1131 -0.1321 -0.0955 -0.1330 -0.0801 -0.2897 
(-5.07) (-4.76) (-2.33) (-3.63) (-1.94) (-3.55)
Never  lived  abroad 0.1318 0.1481 0.1278 0.0624 0.0758 0.0240 
(5.76) (5.56) (2.64) (1.98) (2.12) (0.35)
Age 0.0019 0.0000 0.0062 0.0009 0.0001 0.0032 
(2.30) (0.03) (4.18) (1.20) (0.08) (2.19)
Woman 0.2435 0.3059 0.1497 0.1745 0.2316 0.0587 
(13.91) (13.78) (4.91) (7.07) (7.89) (1.26)
Married -0.0036 -0.0023 -0.0143 0.1043  0.0903  0.1340 
(-0.19) (-0.09) (-0.42) (4.26) (3.09) (2.89)
Catholic 0.0658 0.0441 0.0928 0.0659 0.0605 0.0707 
(2.75) (1.42) (2.31) (1.84) (1.31) (1.22)
Cut1 0.0064 -0.2033 0.3189 -0.1850 0.0707 -0.2083 
Cut2 0.9726 0.8476 1.1260 0.7451 1.0620 0.5484 
Cut3 1.6449 1.5838 1.7013 1.5629 1.8914 1.3419 
Cut4 2.6474 2.6954 2.4932 2.5683 3.0286 2.0781 
No.obs. 15680  9808 5242 8598 6169 2429 
LRchi2 3774.6  2719.3 965.1 2212.1  1749.5 386.0 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PseudoR2 0.0795 0.0921 0.0611 0.0887 0.0977 0.0572 
Loglikelihood -21841.7  -13403.0 -7412.3 -11360.9 -8083.3  -3179.0
Source: see text. T-statistics are in parentheses.39
Table 9.  Different age specifications
Dependent variable is protect. Country dummies included (coefficients not reported)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All West only East only All West only East only
Patriotism 0.1752 0.1672 0.1812 0.1753 0.1663 0.1811
(17.16) (13.07) (10.19) (17.16) (12.99) (10.18)
Chauvinism 0.3305 0.3692 0.2772 0.3305 0.3690 0.2767
(33.88) (30.62) (16.04) (33.88) (30.61) (16.01)
Skill345 -0.0227 -0.1647 0.0948 -0.0335 -0.0717 -0.0697
(-0.57) (-1.01) (1.52) (-0.55) (-0.41) (-0.67)
Skill345*age 0.0003 -0.0020 0.0038
(0.24) (-1.55) (1.99)
Skill345*GDPCAP -0.0095 -0.0027 -0.0244 -0.0095 -0.0029 -0.0246
(-4.18) (-0.35) (-3.31) (-4.19) (-0.38) (-3.33)
National mobility -0.0058 -0.0089 -0.0105 -0.0059 -0.0085 -0.0117
(-0.37) (-0.46) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.44) (-0.42)
International mobility -0.1170 -0.1150 -0.1345 -0.1170 -0.1160 -0.1351
(-6.16) (-5.01) (-3.68) (-6.15) (-5.05) (-3.70)
Never lived abroad 0.1049 0.1199 0.0856 0.1050 0.1191 0.0892
(5.67) (5.63) (2.18) (5.68) (5.59) (2.26)
Age 0.0054 0.0001 0.0148 0.0054 0.0003 0.0136
(2.09) (0.05) (3.13) (2.07) (0.09) (2.86)
Age-squared 0.000000 0.000000 -0.000100 0.000000 0.000000 -0.000100
(-1.57) (0.05) (-2.37) (-1.58) (0.14) (-2.30)
Woman 0.2217 0.2810 0.1173 0.2220 0.2793 0.1213
(15.93) (16.42) (4.64) (15.90) (16.29) (4.79)
Married 0.0239 0.0286 0.0243 0.0240 0.0287 0.0264
(1.50) (1.44) (0.85) (1.50) (1.45) (0.92)
Catholic 0.0664 0.0472 0.0882 0.0665 0.0465 0.0888
(3.34) (1.84) (2.68) (3.35) (1.81) (2.70)
Cut1 0.0274 0.2035 0.3440 0.0259 0.0135 0.3059
Cut2 0.9790 1.2319 1.1342 0.9776 1.0419 1.0961
Cut3 1.6965 1.9999 1.7670 1.6951 1.8099 1.7290
Cut4 2.6983 3.1200 2.5382 2.6969 2.9302 2.5006
No.obs. 24278 15977 7671 24278 15977 7671
LRchi2 6068.4 4556.3 1386.9 6068.4 4558.7 1390.9
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PseudoR2 0.0836 0.0957 0.0612 0.0836 0.0958 0.0614
Loglikelihood -33280 -21524 -10637 -33280 -21522 -10635
Source: see text. T-statistics in parameters.40
Table 10. Simulating the impact on preferences of changing RHS variables
A. Equation (4), Table 4
 Simulated Probability     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Pr(protect==1) |    .014755     .0014167     .0121608    .0177452
        Pr(protect==2) |   .0954396     .0055841     .0846833    .1061769
        Pr(protect==3) |    .195409     .0062344     .1829937    .2076478
        Pr(protect==4) |   .3832816     .0036822      .376044     .390276
        Pr(protect==5) |   .3111148     .0128818      .286102    .3362912
 
First Difference: Change Patriotism from 40th to 60th percentile
 Change in Probability     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0023152     .0002286    -.0027948    -.001922
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0090372     .0006171    -.0102836   -.0079466
       dPr(protect==3) |  -.0093477     .0005717    -.0105066   -.0082473
       dPr(protect==4) |   .0004353     .0007389    -.0010632     .001884
       dPr(protect==5) |   .0202647     .0012482     .0178992    .0227651
First Difference: Change Patriotism from 20th to 80th percentile
 Change in Probability     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0117189     .0011616    -.0141546   -.0097234
       dPr(protect==2) |   -.045126     .0030677     -.051317   -.0397028
       dPr(protect==3) |  -.0463831     .0028001    -.0520588   -.0409887
       dPr(protect==4) |   .0021564     .0036593    -.0052714    .0093273
       dPr(protect==5) |   .1010716     .0061935     .0893281    .1134693
First Difference: Change Chauvinism from 40th to 60th percentile
 Change in Probability     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0061805     .0005189    -.0072785   -.0051952
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0248769      .001137    -.0270738   -.0226583
       dPr(protect==3) |  -.0266989     .0009393    -.0285721   -.0249653
       dPr(protect==4) |  -.0004574     .0020837    -.0047143    .0036249
       dPr(protect==5) |   .0582136     .0020582     .0541598    .0622817
First Difference: Change Chauvinism from 20th to 80th percentile
 Change in Probability     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0247046     .0020259    -.0289362   -.0207627
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0900888     .0039576     -.097731   -.0822445
       dPr(protect==3) |  -.0894131     .0031579    -.0956985    -.083667
       dPr(protect==4) |   .0065264     .0070095    -.0078236    .0199749
       dPr(protect==5) |   .1976801     .0069093     .1840308    .211510741
Table 10. Simulating the impact on preferences of changing RHS variables
A. Equation (4), Table 4 (continued)
First Difference: Impact of high-skill when GDP per capita = $5000
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |   .0026699     .0012682     .0001494    .0052034
       dPr(protect==2) |   .0103182      .004741     .0006345    .0194862
       dPr(protect==3) |   .0105686     .0047525     .0006773    .0195221
       dPr(protect==4) |  -.0006657     .0010204    -.0030787    .0010019
       dPr(protect==5) |  -.0228909     .0102694    -.0420419   -.0014672
First Difference:  Impact of high-skill when GDP per capita = $15000
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |   .0072067     .0009877     .0053957    .0093273
       dPr(protect==2) |   .0263177      .002958     .0206797    .0324438
       dPr(protect==3) |    .025299     .0026539     .0202207    .0305039
       dPr(protect==4) |  -.0041574     .0021097    -.0083383   -.0003163
       dPr(protect==5) |  -.0546661     .0057117    -.0655149   -.0436477
First Difference:  Impact of high-skill when GDP per capita = $25000
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |   .0127708     .0020405     .0090668    .0170057
       dPr(protect==2) |   .0436224     .0054026     .0330583    .0541702
       dPr(protect==3) |   .0389498      .003894     .0312127    .0462664
       dPr(protect==4) |  -.0109429      .004037     -.019564   -.0036387
       dPr(protect==5) |  -.0844001      .008483    -.1006383   -.0677581
First Difference: Impact of national mobility
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |   .0001647      .000602    -.0009862    .0013277
       dPr(protect==2) |   .0006607     .0024323    -.0039293    .0052194
       dPr(protect==3) |   .0007024      .002618     -.004298    .0055967
       dPr(protect==4) |  -3.03e-06     .0002122    -.0004342    .0004178
       dPr(protect==5) |  -.0015247     .0056915    -.0121468    .0094165
First Difference: Impact of international mobility
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
-----------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |   .0049903     .0009142     .0032012    .0068706
       dPr(protect==2) |   .0187507     .0030806     .0125397    .0248353
       dPr(protect==3) |   .0185949     .0029016     .0125033     .024531
       dPr(protect==4) |  -.0021242     .0015527    -.0053734    .0007657
       dPr(protect==5) |  -.0402116     .0062809    -.0528894   -.027118942
Table 10. Simulating the impact on preferences of changing RHS variables
A. Equation (4), Table 4 (continued)
First Difference: Impact of never having lived abroad
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0043958     .0009459    -.0064719   -.0026324
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0166275     .0031617    -.0230548   -.0104391
       dPr(protect==3) |   -.016615     .0029039    -.0221301    -.010629
       dPr(protect==4) |   .0017006     .0015057    -.0010203    .0051738
       dPr(protect==5) |   .0359378      .006238     .0227924    .0476815
First Difference: Impact of changing age from 30 to 60
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0015981     .0005331    -.0026549   -.0005986
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0064954      .002123     -.010649   -.0024426
       dPr(protect==3) |   -.007031     .0023066    -.0115803   -.0026377
       dPr(protect==4) |  -.0001971     .0005872    -.0014513    .0008854
       dPr(protect==5) |   .0153217     .0050335     .0057954     .025114
First Difference: Impact of being female
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0105906     .0009866    -.0127733   -.0087948
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0371693     .0025282    -.0422877   -.0322484
       dPr(protect==3) |  -.0341823     .0023486    -.0386092   -.0295846
       dPr(protect==4) |   .0080248     .0027035     .0025342    .0136012
       dPr(protect==5) |   .0739175     .0049386     .0640913    .0829416
First Difference: Impact of being married or living as married
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0013144     .0005919     -.002546   -.0002151
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0051992     .0022952     -.009917   -.0009015
       dPr(protect==3) |  -.0054664     .0023992      -.01021   -.0009952
       dPr(protect==4) |   .0001146     .0004661    -.0008027    .0011273
       dPr(protect==5) |   .0118654     .0052007     .0021536    .0223169
First Difference: Impact of being a Roman Catholic
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0023132     .0007333    -.0038933   -.0009683
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0097175     .0029776    -.0159036   -.0042047
       dPr(protect==3) |  -.0109054     .0033224    -.0176632   -.0046724
       dPr(protect==4) |  -.0009572     .0008932    -.0029647    .0005849
       dPr(protect==5) |   .0238934     .0072726     .0102972    .038400643
Table 10. Simulating the impact on preferences of changing RHS variables
B. Equation (5), Table 4
 Simulated Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Pr(protect==1) |   .0174649      .002789     .0127167    .0233261
        Pr(protect==2) |   .1264871     .0114484     .1065978    .1500246
        Pr(protect==3) |   .2110957      .009337     .1925624    .2294772
        Pr(protect==4) |   .3859744     .0055172     .3751257    .3963836
        Pr(protect==5) |   .2589779     .0198112     .2198795    .2959962
 First Difference: Impact of being rural
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0049403     .0010727    -.0071378   -.0030334
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0228495     .0041677    -.0308445   -.0147179
       dPr(protect==3) |  -.0199502     .0036924    -.0268114   -.0128275
       dPr(protect==4) |   .0033016     .0028547    -.0020696    .0091907
       dPr(protect==5) |   .0444383     .0082096     .0288076    .0594362
First Difference: Impact of being unemployed
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0023965     .0022055    -.0065941    .0020396
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0109467     .0099035    -.0300374     .008259
       dPr(protect==3) |  -.0094249     .0085891    -.0270617     .006401
       dPr(protect==4) |   .0017947     .0024421      -.00296       .0070637
       dPr(protect==5) |   .0209735     .0191444    -.0142154     .060015
First Difference: Impact of working in public sector
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0015352     .0009784    -.0034262    .0003988
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0067115     .0042186    -.0146584    .0016643
       dPr(protect==3) |  -.0054888     .0034838    -.0121543    .0013485
       dPr(protect==4) |   .0015316     .0012789    -.0004131    .0044134
       dPr(protect==5) |   .0122039     .0077459    -.0029597    .0272057
First Difference: Impact of being self-employed
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |    .003982     .0015977     .0011853    .0072821
       dPr(protect==2) |   .0159954     .0059724     .0050317    .0280853
       dPr(protect==3) |   .0118232     .0043245     .0040024    .0206445
       dPr(protect==4) |  -.0053709     .0028221    -.0116064   -.0010744
       dPr(protect==5) |  -.0264298     .0096174    -.0462615   -.0088937
First Difference: Impact of belonging to a trade union
 Change in Probability |     Mean       Std. Dev.    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       dPr(protect==1) |  -.0003211     .0002013    -.0007417    .0000625
       dPr(protect==2) |  -.0013806       .00085     -.003074       .0002784
       dPr(protect==3) |  -.0011037     .0006855    -.0024854     .000232
       dPr(protect==4) |   .0003517     .0002788    -.0000952    .0010108
       dPr(protect==5) |   .0024536     .0015179    -.0005132    .0055294















































































































































































Figure 2. Skill, protectionism & H/L